dc.contributor.advisor | Anantha P. Chandrakasan and Hae-Seung Lee. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Jeong, Taehoon. | en_US |
dc.contributor.other | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-03T17:42:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-03T17:42:11Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127018 | |
dc.description | Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, May, 2020 | en_US |
dc.description | Cataloged from the official PDF of thesis. | en_US |
dc.description | Includes bibliographical references (pages 125-129). | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | At the interface between analog circuits and a digital processor, an ADC can create a critical hardware security loophole. By exploiting the power side-channel leakage of the ADC, an attacker can expose the private signal chain data. Having recognized the security threat, this thesis explores both aspects of the SAR ADC power side-channel attack (PSA): attack method and its countermeasure. Firstly, this thesis proposes two neural-network-based SAR ADC PSA methods based on multi-layer perceptron net-works (MLP-PSA) and convolutional neural networks (CNN-PSA). When applied to a SAR ADC without PSA protection, the proposed attack methods decode the power supply current waveforms of the SAR ADC into the corresponding A/D conversion results with very high accuracy, demonstrating themselves as powerful ADC PSA methods. Secondly, this thesis proposes a current-equalizer-based SAR ADC PSA countermeasure. A 12-bit, 1.25MS/s prototype SAR ADC is implemented in 65nm CMOS technology for the proof-of-concept. With the proposed PSA countermeasure, the prototype SAR ADC demonstrated a strong PSA-resistance against MLP-PSA. Due to the second-order power side-channel leakage sources of a current equalizer, the prototype SAR ADC showed weaker PSA-resistance against CNN-PSA, but generally protected a significant portion of the information from the attack. | en_US |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | by Taehoon Jeong. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 129 pages | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology | en_US |
dc.rights | MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided. | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | http://dspace.mit.edu.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/handle/1721.1/7582 | en_US |
dc.subject | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. | en_US |
dc.title | Secure analog-to-digital conversion against power side-channel attack | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.description.degree | Ph. D. | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science | en_US |
dc.identifier.oclc | 1191624828 | en_US |
dc.description.collection | Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science | en_US |
dspace.imported | 2020-09-03T17:42:10Z | en_US |
mit.thesis.degree | Doctoral | en_US |
mit.thesis.department | EECS | en_US |